Directory:Logic Museum/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Summa Logicae I 1-7

Latin	English
[Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI]
(i) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: "Terminum voco in quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse".	All those who treat logic try to show that arguments are put together out of propositions and propositions out of terms. Whence a term is nothing else but a proximate part of a proposition. For, defining a term in Prior Analytics I, Aristotle says "I call a term [that] into which a proposition is resolved, i.e. the predicate and that of which it is predicated, either by what is conjoined or disjoined, [expressing] what is the case or is not.
(ii) Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; et ideo ad perfectam notitiam terminorum habendam oportet aliquas divisiones terminorum praecognoscere.	But although every term is part of a proposition, or could be, yet not all terms are of the same nature, and therefore to have a complete knowledge of terms, we must have a preliminary discussion about some of the divisions of terms.
(iii) Est autem sciendum quod sicut secundum Boethium, in I Perihermenias, triplex est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta, tantum habens esse in intellectu, sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus.	Now you should know that, just as according to Boethius on I Perihermenias, there are three types of speech, namely written, spoken, and conceived (the third having existence only in the intellect) so there are three types of term, namely written, spoken and conceived.
(iv) Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptae in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest.	A written term is part of a proposition written down on some corporeal object, which is seen (or is able to be seen) by the corporeal eye.
(v) Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali.	A spoken term is part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and suited to be heard by the bodily ear.
(vi) Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere. Unde isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae sunt illa verba mentalia quae beatus Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, dicit nullius esse linguae, quia tantum in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis voces tamquam signa subordinata eis pronuntientur exterius.	A conceived term is an intention or affection of the soul naturally signifying or co-signifying something [and] suited to be a part of a mental proposition and to supposit for the same thing. Whence these conceived terms and the propositions put together out of them are the "mental words" that the blessed Augustine (De Trinitate XV) says belongs to no language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.
(vii) Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa vox, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret.	[Now I say that utterances are signs subordinated to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, taking the word "signs" in a proper sense, these utterances always signify those concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but rather because utterances are imposed to signify the same things which are signified by concepts of the mind, so that the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies the same thing, so that with an utterance instituted to signify something signified by a concept of the mind, if that concept were to change its significate, the utterance itself would by that fact, without any new institution, change its significate.
(viii) Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod voces sunt "earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae". Sic etiam intendit Boethius quando dicit voces significare conceptus. Et universaliter omnes auctores, dicendo quod omnes voces significant passiones vel sunt notae earum, non aliud intendunt nisi quod voces sunt signa secundario significantia illa quae per passiones animae primario importantur, quamvis aliquae voces primario importent passiones animae seu conceptus, quae tamen secuiidario important alias animae intentiones, sicut inferius ostendetur.	The Philosopher says as much, that ‘utterances are the marks of the affections that are in the soul’. Boethius also means this when he says that utterances signify concepts. And, in general, all writers, in saying that all utterances signify affections [of the soul] or are the marks of those [affections], mean nothing else but that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying what are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul, although some utterances do primarily convey affections of the soul or concepts that other intentions in the soul nevertheless convey secondarily, as will be shown below.
(ix) Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter, quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum.	And what was said about utterances in respect of affections or intentions or concepts is to be held in the same way, analogously, for present purposes, for [terms] that are in writing with respect to utterances.
(x) Inter istos autem terminos aliquae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est quod conceptus seu passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque.	Now certain differences are found among these [kinds of] terms. One is that a concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies. But a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to arbitrary institution. From this there follows another difference, viz. that a spoken or written term can change its significate at will, but a conceived term does not change its significate for the will of anyone.
(xi) Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eiusdem. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sicut etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Sed tam generaliter non loquor hic de signo.	But because of pedantic objectors, you should know that "sign" is taken in two ways. In one way, for everything that, when apprehended, makes something else come into cognition, although it does not make the mind come to a first cognition of it, just as was shown elsewhere, but to an actual [cognition] after an habitual [cognition] of it. In this way, an utterance naturally signifies, just as any effect naturally signifies at least its cause, and just as the barrel-hoop signifies wine in the tavern. But I am not talking here about a sign in so general a way.
(xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est signum naturale.	In another way, a sign is taken for that which makes something come into cognition and is suited to supposit for it, or to be added to such a thing in the proposition, of which sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, such as an expression. Taking the word ‘sign’ in this way, an utterance is a natural sign of nothing.